Discussion Paper |
Corresponding author: Guillaume Latombe ( latombe.guillaume@gmail.com ) Academic editor: Angela Brandt
© 2022 Guillaume Latombe, Bernd Lenzner, Anna Schertler, Stefan Dullinger, Michael Glaser, Ivan Jarić, Aníbal Pauchard, John R. U. Wilson, Franz Essl.
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Citation:
Latombe G, Lenzner B, Schertler A, Dullinger S, Glaser M, Jarić I, Pauchard A, Wilson JRU, Essl F (2022) What is valued in conservation? A framework to compare ethical perspectives. NeoBiota 72: 45-80. https://doi.org/10.3897/neobiota.72.79070
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Perspectives in conservation are based on a variety of value systems. Such differences in how people value nature and its components lead to different evaluations of the morality of conservation goals and approaches, and often underlie disagreements in the formulation and implementation of environmental management policies. Specifically, whether a conservation action (e.g. killing feral cats to reduce predation on bird species threatened with extinction) is viewed as appropriate or not can vary among people with different value systems. Here, we present a conceptual, mathematical framework intended as a tool to systematically explore and clarify core value statements in conservation approaches. Its purpose is to highlight how fundamental differences between these value systems can lead to different prioritizations of available management options and offer a common ground for discourse. The proposed equations decompose the question underlying many controversies around management decisions in conservation: what or who is valued, how, and to what extent? We compare how management decisions would likely be viewed under three idealised value systems: ecocentric conservation, which aims to preserve biodiversity; new conservation, which considers that biodiversity can only be preserved if it benefits humans; and sentientist conservation, which aims at minimising suffering for sentient beings. We illustrate the utility of the framework by applying it to case studies involving invasive alien species, rewilding, and trophy hunting. By making value systems and their consequences in practice explicit, the framework facilitates debates on contested conservation issues, and complements philosophical discursive approaches about moral reasoning. We believe dissecting the core value statements on which conservation decisions are based will provide an additional tool to understand and address conservation conflicts.
Anthropocentrism, biocentrism, ecocentrism, environmental ethics, impact, invasive alien species, moral values, sentientism, speciesism
The consideration of the moral relationship between people and nature and the consequent ethical obligations for conservation is relatively recent in Western culture. Environmental ethics emerged as an academic discipline in the 1970s (
Value systems consider more or less inclusive communities of moral patients, defined as the elements with intrinsic or inherent value towards which humans, considered here as the community of moral agents, are considered to have obligations (in the following, for simplicity, we refer to the community of moral patients as the moral community; Table
Term | Definition |
---|---|
Anthropocentrism (strong) | Value system that considers humans to be the sole, or primary, holder of moral standing, and therefore the concern of direct moral obligations. Non-human species are considered only to the extent that they affect the satisfaction of felt preference of human individuals ( |
Anthropocentrism (weak) | Value theory in which all values are "explained by reference to satisfaction of some felt preference of a human individual or by reference to its bearing upon the ideals which exist as elements in a world view essential to determinations of considered preferences" ( |
Anthropomorphism | “The attribution of human personality or characteristics to something non-human, as an animal, object, etc.” ( |
Biocentrism | Value system considering all living beings as the concern of direct moral obligations ( |
Collectivism | Value system in which a group or collective has a higher value than the individuals that compose it ( |
Compassionate conservation | Conservation approach inspired by virtue ethics based on four tenets: i) do no harm; ii) individuals matter; iii) inclusivity (the value of an individual is independent from the context of the population, e.g. nativity, rarity, etc.); and iv) peaceful coexistence ( |
Community of moral agents | The group of beings considered to have moral responsibility in their actions ( |
Community of moral patients | The group of beings considered to have intrinsic moral value, and towards which moral agents have moral obligations ( |
Conservation welfare | Conservation approach aiming at minimizing animal suffering ( |
Consequentialism | “An ethical doctrine which holds that the morality of an action is to be judged solely by its consequences” ( |
Convergence hypothesis | “If the interests of the human species interpenetrate those of the living Earth, then it follows that anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric policies will converge in the indefinite future” ( |
Deontology | A normative ethical theory considering that “choices are morally required, forbidden, or permitted” ( |
Ecocentrism | Value system considering that species, their assemblages and their functions, as well as more broadly ecosystems, rather than individuals, are the concern of direct moral obligations ( |
Empathy | “The quality or power of projecting one's personality into or mentally identifying oneself with an object of contemplation, and so fully understanding or appreciating it.” ( |
Impact (for the purposes of the framework, Eq.1) | Impact refers to any effect that modifies the wellbeing, health or resilience (for non-sentient beings) of an individual, from physical pain to emotional suffering and death (these notions being interrelated, but not equivalent). |
Inherent value (our definition) | Value possessed by an individual or collective, accounting for their intrinsic value (see definition below) and the effects of multiple context-dependent factors (e.g. charisma, anthropomorphism, organismic complexity, neoteny, cultural importance, religion, or parochialism). For example, wolves and dogs may be considered to have similar intrinsic value under sentientism because they have similar cognitive abilities, but may be valued differently by people who own dogs as pets (i.e. due to parochialism). |
Intrinsic value | Value possessed by an individual or collective as defined by a system of moral valuation, such as anthropocentrism, sentientism, biocentrism or ecocentrism. Once a criterion has been selected in accordance with the system of values (e.g. cognitive ability under sentientism, the choice of a criterion itself may be subjective), intrinsic value is determined by this criterion and does not vary with the context (cf. inherent value). |
Invasive alien species | “Plants, animals, pathogens and other organisms that are non-native to an ecosystem, and which may cause economic or environmental harm or adversely affect human health” (Regulation (EU) No 1143/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 on the prevention and management of the introduction and spread of invasive alien species). |
Moral community | See “Community of moral patients”and cf. "Community of moral agents". |
Moral dilemma | Situation in which a moral agent regards itself as having moral reasons to do different, incompatible actions ( |
Nativism | Value system considering that species that have evolved in a given location have a higher value in this location than species that have evolved somewhere else. In nativism, value varies spatially ( |
Nature despite people | Management conceptual approach aiming at conserving biological diversity (focusing on species and habitats) specifically in response to human impacts on the environment, e.g. sustainable use ( |
Nature for itself | Management conceptual approach aiming at conserving biological diversity (focusing on wilderness and natural habitats) through human exclusion, for example through the creation of parks and protected areas ( |
Nature for people | Management conceptual approach aiming at conserving the components of nature beneficial to humans (focusing on ecosystems and their services) ( |
Neoteny | “The retention of juvenile characteristics in a (sexually) mature organism” ( |
New conservation | Discipline aiming at preserving biological diversity through the conservation of natural elements providing services and contribution to human wellbeing ( |
Normative postulate | Value statements that make up the basis of an ethic of appropriate attitudes toward other forms of life ( |
Parochialism | Ideology in which moral regard is directed “towards socially closer and structurally tighter targets, relative to socially more distant and structurally looser targets”, and, by extension, to species phylogenetically, cognitively, or in appearance closer to humans ( |
People and nature | Management conceptual approach considering that humans and nature are interdependent and therefore aiming at achieving compromises in the conservation of nature and human wellbeing ( |
Relational value | “Preferences, principles, and virtues associated with relationships, both interpersonal and as articulated by policies and social norms […] Relational values are not present in things but derivative of relationships and responsibilities to them.” ( |
Sentience | The ability to experience phenomenal consciousness, i.e. the qualitative, subjective, experiential, or phenomenological aspects of conscious experience, rather than just the experience of pain and pleasure ( |
Sentientism | Value system considering sentient beings as the concern of direct moral obligations ( |
Speciesism | Value system in which some species are considered to have a higher value than others, for various possible reasons ( |
Suffering | Negative emotion, sometimes called emotional distress, experienced by sentient beings, and which can result from different causes, including but not limited to physical pain ( |
Traditional conservation | Discipline aiming at preserving biological diversity through the management of nature, and based on four value-driven normative postulates: “diversity of organisms is good,” “ecological complexity is good,” “evolution is good,” and “biotic diversity has intrinsic value” ( |
Utilitarian value | Value given to an individual or collective by humans, based on its utility. For example, dogs may have a utilitarian value for herding sheep or as guard-dogs (see also inherent value). In our framework, utilitarian value is expressed through the impact I on the species with inherent value (i.e. the moral community), but is not expressed explicitly through V (Eq. 1). |
Virtue ethics | Ethical doctrine that emphasises the virtues, or moral character as the reason for action ( |
Differences between the moral communities considered by value systems influenced by anthropocentrism, sentientism, biocentrism and ecocentrism (depicted by the nested circles and colours) and how values can differ between members of the different moral communities. a) Anthropocentrism, sentientism and biocentrism all value individuals intrinsically, but consider different moral communities, i.e. the value of an individual depends on the category of species it belongs to, with {humans} ∈ {sentient beings} ∈ {all living organisms}. Species outside of the moral community may have a utilitarian value for species in the moral community (represented by the arrow), which will be reflected by changes in the impact variable. b) The intrinsic value, in combination with contextual factors, defines the inherent value V of an individual or species and the distribution of V will change depending on the set of species included in the moral community. Anthropocentrism, sentientism and biocentrism value individuals from different groups of species. Biocentrism and ecocentrism give value to the same group of species, i.e. all living organisms, but while biocentrism values individuals, ecocentrism values ecological collectives, i.e. species or species assemblages and ecosystems. Note that species can have both an inherent and a utilitarian value. Within the moral community, species may have equal inherent values, but subjective perceptions and different value systems may also assign different values to different species. The skewness of the value distribution then indicates the degree or strength of speciesism with respect to the species of reference, assumed here to be the human species, and is influenced by many factors, including charisma, cultural context, etc.
In the following, our aim is to conceptualise and decompose value systems in an explicit, and potentially (but not necessarily) quantifiable, fashion using a common mathematical framework, and to explore their repercussions for the perception of conservation management actions by stakeholders with different value systems. We argue that doing so allows for explicit comparison between these perceptions to identify sources of potential conflicts. First, we recapitulate four archetypal value systems in environmental affairs and relate them to different conservation philosophies. Since identifying commonalities in the perspectives of different parties is key in conflict management (
Here, we focus on a Western perspective of value systems that have been internationally considered for environmental policies and the management of nature (
The Western perspective of moral valuation encompasses a diverse set of value systems with respect to the components of nature that form the moral community. Traditionally, one can distinguish at least four archetypal value systems: anthropocentrism, sentientism, biocentrism, and ecocentrism (
Anthropocentrism values nature by the benefits it brings to people through ecosystem services, which encompasses economic, biological, and cultural benefits humans can derive from nature (
Sentientism considers that humans and all sentient animals value their life, and experience pleasure, pain, and suffering (Table
Biocentrism considers that life has intrinsic value. Although different perspectives on why life has value exist (
Some ecocentric, or holistic, value systems consider that ecological collectives, such as species or ecosystems, have intrinsic value, independently from the individuals that comprise them. Species can have different values, i.e. speciesism (Table
In practice, the separation between anthropocentrism, sentientism, biocentrism, and ecocentrism is blurry, and values given to different species may vary under the same general approach. For example, biocentrism can range from complete egalitarianism between organisms to a gradual valuation resembling sentientism. These four value systems can also interact with other systems that use other criteria than the intrinsic characteristics of individuals to define the moral community. For example, nativism is a system that values organisms indigenous to a spatial location or an ecosystem over those that have been introduced by humans. Nativism can therefore interact with any of the four systems presented above to alter the value attributed to a species in a given context. Finally, how someone values individuals of different species is often influenced by their personal views and experiences (
To account for the different elements that can be combined to create the concept of value, in the following, we distinguish between ‘intrinsic’, ‘inherent’, and ‘utilitarian’, value (our definitions; Table
Conservation practices can historically be divided into three main categories, closely related to specific systems of moral valuation (
Different value systems (or combination of) correspond to different conservation perspectives, which were introduced at different points in time (the timeline is approximate for illustrative purpose; see also
By contrast the more recent, anthropocentric ‘nature for people’ perspective (
More recently, the necessity to account for the interdependence between the health of nature and human wellbeing [i.e. ‘people and nature’ (
Finally, although the animal rights movement, based on sentientism, originated in the 19th century (
Many of the conflicts in conservation are grounded in the failure to identify and formalise differences in world views, which contain elements of the four archetypes presented above, influenced by cultural norms, economic incentives etc. (
Our mathematical formalisation conceptualises the consequences of environmental management actions. As we develop below, these consequences will be defined differently depending on the value system, but can be understood generally as the consequences for the members of the moral community. Under anthropocentrism, these will be consequences for humans; under sentientism, these will be consequences for sentient individuals; under biocentrism and ecocentrism, these will be consequences for biodiversity. We argue that our mathematical formalisation can account for these different value systems (see Suppl. material
Eq.1
where Īs is a function (e.g. mean, maximum, etc.) of the impact (direct and indirect) resulting from the management action on all individuals of species s, Vs is the inherent value attributed to an individual of species s (as described above), Ns is the abundance of species s, and a determines the importance given to a species based on its abundance or rarity (and enables to account for the importance of a species rather than an individual, see below). The unit of C depends on how other parameters are defined, which themselves depend on the value system considered. In summary, the higher the impact on species with high values, the higher the consequences.
Inherent value Vs can have a monetary unit or be unit-less depending on how it is defined. It can be continuous or categorical (e.g. null, low, high – quantifiable as 0, 1, 2 or any other quantitative scale). Our definition of inherent value here is extremely broad, as the purpose of this work is not to define what such value should be, rather, it is to be flexible enough to encompass multiple perspectives and the subjectivity of the assessor, and be based on intrinsic, utilitarian or relational values (
The parameter a can take both positive and negative values. A value of 1 means that consequences are computed over individuals. If all values Vs were the same, a = 1 implies that all individuals in the moral community (Table
The impact Is is computed at the individual level. It can be limited to the probability of death of individuals or changes in per capita recruitment rate, thus allowing to compute a proxy for extinction risk if a ≤ 0, but can also include animal welfare, biophysical states, etc. As for Vs, continuous or categorical scales may be used. Different measures of impact can be considered under a same system of value, in which case Equation 1 should be applied to each one separately (see section “Application of the mathematical framework” below for details). Is can only encompass the direct impact of a management action (in a narrow view that only the direct impact of humans, i.e. the moral agents, should be considered, and that the direct impacts from non-moral agents should not be considered), but also include its indirect impact resulting from biotic interactions (considering that, in the context of management and therefore human actions, these indirect impacts are ultimately the result of the actions of the moral agents). One would therefore need to define a baseline corresponding to either i) the lowest possible measurable level of impact (e.g. being alive if death is the only measure of impact, or no sign of disease and starvation for biophysical states; this would obviously be more complicated for welfare), so that I would only be positive; ii) the current state of the system, in which case impacts could be positive or negative for different species; or iii) the past state of a system, for example prior to the introduction of alien species (see (
Considering Equation 1 in an operational fashion, the consequences C computed from it can be interpreted as a constructed attribute to measure the achievement of objectives in conservation under different value systems (sensu
Set of questions to ask in order to evaluate Equation 1 and related concepts. The purpose is to guide users in exploring all the elements to consider when assessing the consequences of management actions rather than necessarily attempting a quantification of each. See Table
Element of Equation 1 | Question | Mathematical formulation | Examples of interpretation |
---|---|---|---|
Vs | What relative value do you place on individuals of different species? | What is the distribution of Vs? | If a few species have a disproportionately high value compared to others, i.e. speciesism, the distribution of Vs is highly skewed. If all species have a similar value, the distribution of Vs is even. |
Is | What measure(s) of impact do you consider? | What is the unit of Is? How to quantify Is? | If only individual survival matters, Is can be quantified as the probability of death, and assessed through surveys. If animal wellbeing matters, approaches based on physical aspect, stress, etc. can be used to quantify Is. |
a | Do you value individuals or species? If you value species, should rare species have more values than common ones? | What is the value of a? Is a positive or negative? | If every individual is valued the same (regardless of which species they are) then a=1. This means that common species will be more highly valued overall in the assessment of the conservation action. If all species are valued the same (regardless of differences in abundance) then a=0. This means that individuals of a rare species will be more highly valued than individuals of a common species in direct proportion to the abundance of the species. If rare species are valued more than common ones then a<0. |
Applying the framework presented in Equation 1 to determine the likely consequence of a management action on a system with two species, highlighting possible moral dilemmas in red. In the case shown a is set to 1 for simplicity, but the two species have different inherent values Vhigh and Vlow (i.e. how individuals are valued does not vary with abundance, but individuals of one species are valued more than the other species). The likely consequence changes with the relative abundance of the two species [top row (a) vs. bottom row (b)] and with whether the impact of the management intervention is positive (I+) or negative (I-) on the respective species [columns (i-iv)]. a) The species with high value has higher or similar abundance to the species with low value. If the impacts I+ and I- have similar orders of magnitudes or |I+| > |I-|, scenario (a,ii) generates positive consequences (C+) because Vhigh × Nhigh > Vlow × Nlow. Similarly, if the impacts I+ and I- have similar orders of magnitudes or |I+| < |I-|, scenario (a,iii) generates negative consequences (C-). If |I+| |I-| or |I+| > |I-| (for scenarios (a,ii) and (a,iii) respectively), the difference of impact can counter-balance Vhigh × Nhigh > Vlow × Nlow, making desirable consequences undesirable and vice versa. However, the difference of magnitude between I+ and I- at which this switch occurs is difficult to determine due to the different units of V, N, and I. This uncertainty corresponds to a moral dilemma due to a conflict between the desire to have a small positive impact on the species with the larger value and abundance, and the desire to avoid a very negative impact on the species with the lower value and abundance for scenario (a,ii). For scenario (a,iii), the dilemma is due to a conflict between the desire to avoid a small negative impact on the species with the higher value and abundance, and the desire to have a very positive impact on the species with the lower value and abundance. b) The species with higher value Vhigh has the lower abundance Nlow. If impacts are different between the two species, the opposition between V and N will most likely generate moral dilemmas (C?). If Vhigh × Nlow > Vlow × Nhigh, scenario (b,ii) is equivalent to scenario (a,ii), and to scenario (a,iii) otherwise (and scenario (b,iii) is equivalent to scenario (b,iii), and to scenario (a,ii) otherwise), but because value and abundance have different units, it is difficult to determine for which value and abundance Vhigh × Nlow = Vlow × Nhigh. Therefore, an additional moral dilemma arises due to a conflict between the desire to avoid a negative impact on the larger population and the desire to avoid a negative impact on the species with the higher value.
If Equation 1 could be evaluated, for each measure of impact and each system of values, Equation 1 would produce relative rather than absolute values. The values of consequences C of a management action under different value systems and measure of impact cannot be directly compared with each other, because the unit and range of values of C can vary between value systems. Instead, Equation 1 can be used to rank a set of management actions for each value system or measure of impact based on their assessed consequences, to identify management actions representing consensus, compromises or conflicts amongst value systems.
Equation 1 is particularly useful to identify potential moral dilemmas, i.e. situations in which management options are conflicting under the same value system (Table
In some situations the implication of Equation 1 is clear. For example, if an impact is positive for a highly valued, highly abundant species, but slightly negative for a few individuals of another species that is not considered very important (C = I+ × Vhigh × Nhigh + I- × Vlow × Nlow), the consequence will be positive (Fig. 3aii). However, if the magnitude of the negative impact is much higher than that of the positive impact (|I+| |I-|), the consequence can become negative. Similarly, if impact is negative for the species with the highest value and abundance, and positive for the other species (C = I- × Vhigh × Nhigh + I+ × Vlow × Nlow), the situation is clear if positive and negative impacts have the same magnitude, but it will shift once the magnitude of the positive impact becomes higher than the magnitude of the negative impact (|I+| > |I-|; the difference of magnitude will likely be lower than in the first example, because of the differences in sign; Fig. 3aiii). Since impact, value and abundance have different units, the thresholds at which these shifts occur are difficult to assess, and so the consequences can be highly debatable. This can create moral dilemmas, e.g. between the desire to have a small positive impact on a larger population with higher value and the desire to avoid a very negative impact on the species with the lower value and abundance (Fig. 3aii); and between the desire to avoid a small negative impact on the larger population with the higher value and the desire to have a very positive impact on the species with the lower value and abundance (Fig. 3aiii). Moral dilemmas will be even more likely to occur if the species with the higher value has the lower abundance (C = I+ × Vhigh × Nlow + I- × Vlow × Nhigh or C = I- × Vhigh × Nlow + I+ × Vlow × Nhigh; Fig. 3bii,iii). If Vhigh × Nlow > Vlow × Nhigh, the example depicted in Fig. 3bii is equivalent to the example depicted in Fig. 3aii described above, and Fig. 3biii is equivalent to the example depicted in Fig. 3aiii. If Vhigh × Nlow < Vlow × Nhigh, the example depicted in Fig. 3bii is equivalent to the example depicted in Fig. 3aiii described above, and Fig. 3biii is equivalent to the example depicted in Fig. 3aii. As above, it is difficult to determine when the inequality will change direction because of the difference in the units of V and N. This reflects a moral dilemma due to a conflict between the desire to avoid a negative impact on the larger population and the desire to avoid a negative impact on the species with the higher value. In summary, uncertainty in the computation of Equation 1, and in particular the need to compare parameters with different units (i.e. impact, value, and abundance), can therefore be interpreted as a moral dilemma (Fig.
In addition, some actions might not follow moral norms compared to others despite having more desirable consequences. For example, killing individuals may be considered less moral, but more efficient to preserve biodiversity or ecosystem services than using landscape management. Solving these moral dilemmas is complex, and beyond the scope of this publication, but approaches such as multi-criteria decision analyses (MCDA;
Similarly, environmental conflicts will likely emerge when comparing the rankings generated by Equation 1 under different value systems considering different distributions of values, and different measures of impact. MCDA (
In the following, we discuss the complexity of assessing the different variables and parameters of Equation 1 under different value systems using the set of primary questions defined above. By doing so, it becomes possible to identify ambiguity, difficulty of operationality, etc., to eventually move towards a good constructed attribute (although such a constructed attribute may not be reached in practice). We also discuss how, despite the difficulty to quantify the variables described above, this framework can be used as a heuristic (rather than operational) tool to capture the implications of considering different value systems for determining the appropriateness of a conservation action, and to better understand conservation disputes.
Over the past decade there has been some debate between proponents of traditional conservation, and those of new conservation (Table
Traditional conservation is based on an ecocentric value system and seeks to maximise diversity of organisms, ecological complexity, and to enable evolution (
C = ∑species s (excluding humans)Īs × Vs × Nsa < 0 Eq. 2
Assigning a stronger weight to rare species (a < 0) accounts for the fact that rare species are more likely to go extinct, decreasing the diversity of organisms. Evolution and ecological complexity are not explicitly accounted for in Equation 2. To do so, one may adapt Equation 2 and consider lineages or functional groups instead of species as the unit over which impacts are aggregated.
Because traditional conservation seeks to maximise diversity, Is can be defined as the probability of individuals dying. Is × Nsa < 0 will then be proportional to the extinction risk of a species (for an operational application, a proper model for extinction probability could be used in lieu of Is × Nsa < 0). The Vs distribution could be considered uniform over all species, in the absence of biases.
New conservation considers that many stakeholders (“resource users”, Kareiva, 2014) tend to have an anthropocentric value system, and that conservation approaches that do not incorporate such a perspective will likely not succeed at maximizing diversity of organisms (
C = ∑stakeholders t Īt × Vt × Nt Eq. 3
where Īt is the average impact of management on the group of stakeholders t, including indirect impacts through the effect of management of non-human species. Īt can correspond to economic impacts, or encompass categorical measures of wellbeing (e.g.
New conservation holds an ambiguous perspective, stating that it should make “sure people benefit from conservation”, while at the same time it does not “want to replace biological-diversity based conservation with a humanitarian movement” (
C = ∑species s (excluding humans)Īs (Chumans) × Vs × Nsa < 0 Eq. 4
where Chumans is computed using Equation 3, and assuming a monotonic and positive relationship between Īs and Chumans.
The link between biodiversity and ecosystem services is strongly supported, even if many unknowns remain (
People and nature views seek to simultaneously benefit human wellbeing and biodiversity (Fig.
We expressed traditional and new conservation with Equations 2, 3 and 4, which correspond to extreme interpretations of these two approaches (excluding humans or considering specific utilities of species). Doing so illustrates how our mathematical framework can capture the pitfalls of failing to explicitly define normative postulates for conservation approaches. As a result, Equations 2, 3 and 4 will likely generate conflicting results in the ranking of different management actions, especially if few types of impacts are considered. The debates over new conservation have taken place in a discursive fashion, which has not provided a clear answer to the values defended by this approach (
The question of if and how animal welfare should be integrated into conservation practice is increasingly debated (
Despite the near-universal support of conservation practitioners and scientists for compassion towards wildlife and ensuring animal welfare (
List of factors to consider regarding the effects of environmental management actions from an environmental ethics perspective.
Factor | Influence on variables and outputs in Equations 1 to 5 |
---|---|
Biotic interactions | The impact or suffering of individuals from one species can be caused by individuals from another species, either through direct or indirect interactions. Management actions can therefore also have non-trivial indirect impacts on some species. |
Capacity to provide ecosystem services | The presence of a specific species may increase the fitness/welfare of other species through the ecosystem services it provides. Since these effects can be difficult to quantify explicitly, the value of such species may be increased in Equations 1 to 4 to account for them. |
Discounting rate | Rate at which impacts that occur in the future lose importance. |
Impact quantification and commensurability | How the impacts of management actions are quantified is dependent on value systems, as some impacts (such as death) may be considered incommensurable to others (such as suffering). |
Responsibility from previous actions | Previous human actions on certain species, such as reintroduction of domesticated species or the introduction of alien species , obviously can have had a direct impact on these species, but can also change the perception of the public and therefore change the inherent value attributed to these species or change the morality of an action. |
Spatial scale | The spatial scale will change the abundance N and the number of species considered. As a result, a management action that is more beneficial than another at a small scale may not be such at a larger scale, and vice versa. Additionally, the spatial scale can change the inherent value of species, for example under nativism, or because of the range of cultures that are considered. |
Temporal scale | The time frame over which the impact or the suffering of individuals is computed can change their values. Management actions may decrease welfare of individuals in the short term, but be beneficial in the long term once the ecosystem has stabilised. Similarly, not culling some population may cause less suffering on the short term, but increase it in the future by disrupting ecosystem services, leading to population collapse due to lack of resources, etc. |
Uncertainty of impact | The complexity of an ecological system can make the impact of management actions on different species difficult to assess precisely, therefore creating potential errors, especially in the presence of multiple biotic interactions. This may lead to an incorrect estimation of the consequences C. |
Uncertainty of value expressions and preferences | Quantifying the value given by a person or a group of people to an individual is difficult, context-dependent, and highly subjective. Sensitivity analyses on the distribution of values can be used to account for such uncertainty. |
A consequentialist, sentientist perspective aims at maximizing happiness, or conversely minimising suffering, for all sentient beings, an approach also termed ‘utilitarianism’ (
It has become widely accepted that animals experience emotions (
Under these considerations for defining impact and value of species, the consequences of a conservation action can be computed as a function of suffering of individuals from species s Ss, their capacity to experience emotion and suffering Es, and the abundance of species s:
Eq. 5
Although V (Es) should be measured in an objective fashion, many factors may influence the relationship between the inherent value and the emotional capacity of a species. For example, high empathy (Table
The short-term suffering resulting from pain and directly caused by lethal management actions, such as the use of poison to control invasive alien species (
The concept of animal welfare and how to measure it is extremely complex (
It has been argued that sentientism and ecocentrism are not fully incompatible (
One issue that may be irreconcilable between ecocentric approaches such as traditional conservation and approaches based on sentientism is the fate of rare and endangered species with limited or no sentience. Under utilitarian sentientism, the conservation of non-sentient species ranks lower than the conservation of sentient species, and consequently they are not included in Equation 5. For example, endangered plant species that are not a resource for the maintenance of sentient populations would receive no attention, as there would be few arguments for their conservation. Traditional conservation would focus on their conservation, as they would have a disproportionate impact in Equation 2, due to low abundance leading to a high value for N a < 0.
Finally, it is important to note that the current body of knowledge shows that the link between biodiversity and animal welfare mentioned above especially applies to the increase of native biodiversity. Local increase of biodiversity due to the introduction of alien species may only be temporary due to extinction debt (
From an operational perspective, this framework shares similarities with mathematical approaches used in conservation triage (
In contrast, our framework allows more flexibility to encompass a range of value systems, as shown above. However, given that the data needed for quantifying parameters of Equations 1 to 5 related to value, impact, emotional capacity and suffering are scarce and often very difficult to measure, this framework in its current form would be difficult to use as a quantitative decision tool to evaluate alternative management actions, contrary to triage equations. Rather, our equations decompose the question underlying many controversies around management decisions in conservation: what or who is valued, how, and to what extent?
Despite the difficulty to apply the framework, it can guide the search for approaches that may be used to develop quantification schemes for the different parameters of the framework and therefore obtain a better appreciation of the different facets of the valuation of nature. For example, grading systems may be developed to assess impact and suffering based on various indicators, including appearance, physiology, and behaviour (
The second difference from conservation triage is that the latter considers additional criteria that were not addressed here, including feasibility, cost, and efficiency (including related uncertainties). The combination of these different perspectives calls for appropriate methods to include them all in decision making, which can be done using MCDA (
The issue of spatial and temporal scale also warrants consideration (Table
Equations 1 to 5 assume that all individuals from a given species have the same value or emotional capacities (or rather an average value is used across all individuals). However, intraspecific differences in value may be important for conservation. For example, reproductively active individuals contributing to population growth/recovery may be given a higher value in an ecocentric perspective. Trophy hunters might prefer to hunt adult male deer with large antlers. Intraspecific value may also vary spatially, for example between individuals in nature reserves or in highly disturbed ecosystems. In such cases, Equation 1 may need to be adapted to use custom groups of individuals with specific values within species, similar to Equation 3.
Finally, it is crucial to account for biotic interactions in our framework to comprehensively assess the indirect impacts of management actions on different species (Table
In the following, we present three case studies where conservation actions have either failed, had adverse effects, or were controversial, and we explore how our framework can help to identify normative postulates underlying these situations. Although these case studies have been discussed at length in the articles and reports we cite, we argue that our framework helps capture the different components of the controversies in a more straightforward and objective fashion than using a discursive approach that might require either emotionally loaded language or more neutral but less understood neologisms.
The grey squirrel (Sciurus carolinensis) is native to North America and was introduced in various locations in Europe during the late nineteenth and the twentieth century (
Based on the impacts of the grey squirrel, an eradication campaign was implemented in 1997 in Italy, with encouraging preliminary results (
Are red and grey squirrels valued differently?
What types of impact are considered?
Is the population of red squirrels impacted by grey squirrels larger than the population of grey squirrels to be controlled?
The arguments of animal rights activists led to the following answers to these three questions. (i) The humanisation of the grey squirrel consists of increasing the perception of its emotional capacity Egs > Ers (and therefore V (Egs) > V (Ers)). (ii) Minimising the impact of the grey squirrel is equal to restricting the time scale to a short one and to likely minimising the amount of suffering S caused by grey squirrels on other species (under a sentientist perspective), or the number of red squirrels that will die because of grey squirrels (under a biocentric perspective). In other words, Sgs = Srs (and therefore I (Sgs) = I (Srs)) or Igs = Irs without management and Sgs > Srs (and therefore I (Sgs) > I (Srs)) or Igs > Irs under management. (iii) Not mentioning differences in species abundance implies that the impacted populations of red and grey squirrels would have the same size under any management. Following these three points, the consequences under management Cm = I (Sgs) × V (Egs) + I (Srs) × V (Ers) are higher than without management, due to the increase in V (Egs) and I (Sgs). The application of our framework therefore clarifies a discourse whose perception could otherwise be altered because of techniques such as an appeal to emotion.
The framework can thus be used to provide recommendations for what the advocates for the eradication campaign would have needed to have done: i) increase the value Ers of red squirrels in a similar way as what was done for grey squirrels, so that their relative values compared to grey squirrels would remain the same as before the communication campaign by the animal rights activists; ii) better explain the differences in animal death and suffering caused by the long-term presence of the grey squirrel compared to the short-term, carefully designed euthanasia protocol, which would avoid a subjective perception of the distribution of S; and iii) highlight the differences in the number of individuals affected. The consequences would then be computed as C = V (Egs) × I (Sgs) × Ngs + V (Ers) × I (Srs) × Nrs. In that case, assuming the amount grey squirrels suffer as a result of being euthanised is the same as red squirrels suffer from the grey squirrels, and all squirrels (be they grey or red) are valued the same (i.e. avoiding nativism), the mere differences Nrs > Ngs in abundance would lead to a higher value of C without management. This would further increase by extending the impacts of grey squirrels to other species, as mentioned above.
A more fundamental issue, however, is that in some value systems it would not be acceptable to actively kill individuals, even if that meant letting grey squirrels eliminate red squirrels over long periods of time (
De-domestication, the intentional reintroduction of domesticated species to the wild, is a recent practice in conservation that raises new ethical questions related to the unique status of these species (
From a traditional conservation perspective, disregarding animal welfare and focusing on species diversity and ecological restoration, the project was a success. The introduction of the three herbivore species led to sustainable populations (despite high winter mortality events), and ensured stability of bird populations without the need for further interventions (
However, the welfare of individuals from the three charismatic large herbivorous species became a point of conflict. In terms of the framework, it appears that the conflict was driven by considering the outcome of Equation 5 in addition to that of Equation 2 to estimate the overall evaluation of the management approach, i.e. a change from only considering impacts on individual survival to also considering impacts based on suffering, with the acknowledgement that Es should be considered (
The reserve managers examined a number of sustainable measures to improve the welfare of individuals from the three species (therefore decreasing Ss to compensate the increase in Vs). These included recommendations to increase access to natural shelter in neighbouring areas of woodland or forestry, to create shelter ridges to increase survival in winter as an ethical and sustainable solution, and to use early culling to regulate populations and avoid suffering from starvation in winter (
Trophy hunting, the use of charismatic species for hunting activities, has been argued to be good for conservation when revenues are reinvested properly into nature protection and redistributed across local communities, but faces criticisms for moral reasons (
In traditional conservation, trophy hunting is desirable if it directly contributes to the maintenance of species diversity. That is, it should decrease impacts I evaluated as individual survival over all or the majority of species with high inherent value, leading to improved consequences for biodiversity C in Equation 2 (a multi-species generalisation of Fig.
From an animal welfare perspective, trophy hunting appears to be in direct contradiction with a decrease in animal suffering, and has been criticised by proponents of compassionate conservation (
A variety of value systems exist in conservation. These are based on different underlying normative postulates and can differ between stakeholders, resulting in differing preferences for conservation practices among people. Here, we have proposed a framework with a formal set of equations to conceptualise and decompose these different perspectives from a consequentialist point of view. In this framework, the different value systems supported by different conservation approaches follow the same structure, but can differ in the variables used, and in the values they take. Such a formalisation, by necessity, does not capture the full range of complex and nuanced real-world situations in environmental decision-making, and the elements of the equations can be difficult to estimate. However, this framework is not intended to be an operational approach readily applicable across all value systems. Rather, the mathematical structure and the systematic examination of the elements of the framework provides a method to make the underlying value systems and the resulting conflicts explicit and transparent, which is essential for the planning and implementation of pro-active management. The search for consensus in conservation can be counter-productive and favour status-quo or ‘do nothing’ against pro-active management (
We thank Franck Courchamp, Vincent Devictor, Jordan Hampton, Tina Heger, Jonathan Jeschke, Thomas Potthast and anonymous reviewers for extremely useful comments on previous versions of this manuscript. This research was funded through the 2017–2018 Belmont Forum and BiodivERsA joint call for research proposals, under the BiodivScen ERA-Net COFUND programme, and with the funding organisations Austrian Science Foundation FWF for GL, BL, AS, FE, and SD (BiodivERsA-Belmont Forum Project ‘Alien Scenarios’, grant no. I 4011-B32; grant no. I3757-B29). AP was funded by Conicyt PIA CCTE AFB170008 and ANID PIA FB210006. IJ acknowledges support by the J. E. Purkyně Fellowship of the Czech Academy of Sciences. JRUW thanks the South African Department of Forestry, Fisheries, and the Environment (DFFE) for funding noting that this publication does not necessarily represent the views or opinions of DFFE or its employees.
Appendix S1, S2
Data type: Docx. file
Explanation note: Appendix S1. Formalisation of ecosystem-based ecocentrism. Appendix S2. Examples of conflicting situations between traditional and compassionate conservation.